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Much has been written about dissident regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia or Transnistria. Unfortunately 
until today little attention is given to Gagauzia, a dissident region that rejected the current Moldovan 
rapprochement towards the EU in its local referendum, organized in 2014. In contemporary academic literature 
very little is known about the influence of dissident regions like Gagauzia, Transnistria or Abkhazia on the EU 
rapprochement of their sovereign nation. Along with interviews and other primary sources a model is provided 
to discover the influence of the three mentioned dissident regions on the EU rapprochement. This research, at 
least, enriches the current existing academic literature regarding Gagauzia, at the same time it deeply emphasises 
the limited influence of dissident regions on sovereign nations’ EU rapprochement.  
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1. Introduction 
 On June 27, 2014, the European Union member states, together with Georgia, 
Moldova and Ukraine, gathered at an EU summit in Brussels to sign the Association 
Agreements. These three signatories became nation states after the collapse of the SU and are 
currently under political influence of both the Russian Federation and the EU. Additionally, 
all three have dissident regions on their territory and a significant part of their population that 
prefer a different geopolitical direction than their government. One of these dissident regions 
is the Autonomous Republic Gagauzia, a what seems to be a new dissident region at 
Southeastern Moldova. This region appears to be anti-EU, portrayed clearly in the referendum 
held at February 2, 2014, organized because of dissatisfaction with Moldovan rapprochement 
towards the EU. Moreover, the autonomous republic wanted to portray it could influence 
Moldovan foreign policy by organizing this referendum (Calus 2014, 4). These anti-EU and 
pro-Russian sentiments in Gagauzia are easy to determine. Therefor the question is, does a 
tiny dissident region have the ability to influence the EU-Moldova rapprochement. This thesis 
aims to research the possible influence of a dissident region on EU rapprochement of its 
sovereign state. 
1.1 Research question 
 In short, dissident regions are non-state actors that dissociate in various ways because 
they mainly disagree with the policies of the government or the whole nation to which they 
originally belong. There are many dissident regions in Eastern Europe, two on Moldovan 
territory: Gagauzia and Transnistria; and two on Georgian territory: Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia. This thesis places a comprehensive focus on Gagauzia and the influence that this 
region might have on Moldova’s EU rapprochement, this makes ‘dissident regions’ and ‘EU 
rapprochement’ the most important concepts. In order to cover the broader angle of dissident 
regions and their influence both Abkhazia and Transnistria will be added as control cases. All 
three regions are covered by the following research question:  
Do the dissident regions Abkhazia, Gagauzia, and Transnistria influence the 
rapprochement of their sovereign state towards the European Union?  
In short, the word rapprochement is used because it reflects the increased cooperation and 
involvement of the non-member state with the EU. The word is preferred over integration 
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because this term emphasizes increased cooperation among EU member states. The EU sees 
this rapprochement with non-memberstates as the opportunity to work with the partners to 
reduce poverty and create an area of shared prosperity and values based on deeper economic 
integration (European Commission 2003). Next to this rapprochement is characterized by 
increased diplomatic relations and agreements, such as EUBAM , EU Eastern Partnership, 1
and the Association Agreement.  
1.2 Research contribution 
The goals of this thesis, achieved by answering the research question, are to innovate 
and contribute to contemporary academic literature. The innovatory aspect of this research 
addresses the limited research done into the influence of dissident regions on internal policies 
of their sovereign state. Currently, most research on dissident regions concerns conflictstudies 
and the possible future outcomes of that conflict. This research innovates in its aspect of 
comparing de-facto states (Abkhazia and Transnistria) with non-de-facto states (Gagauzia). 
The contributory aspect of this research concerns Gagauzia’s poor coverage in 
contemporary academic literature. Poor coverage occurred because of Gagauzia’s quiet 
existence and its turmoil being submerged by other issues at world stage such as Ebola and 
the Crimean secession. Besides this, Gagauzia is just a small region at southern Moldova with 
about 150,000 inhabitants, therefor initial world focus is not on this region. Since not much 
has been written about Gagauzia, this research will be contributory to academic literature 
since it has a major focus on Gagauzia but also determines the influence of dissident regions 
on EU rapprochement.  
 EUBAM is a border assistance mission in both Moldova and Ukraine in order to assist these nations in their 1
struggles with criminal activities and smuggling around their borders. 
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2. Methodology  
2.1 Concepts & variables 
The research goal is to determine whether or not Gagauzia influences EU 
rapprochement of Moldova. Both Transnistria and Abkhazia will be analyzed simultaneously 
because they function as control cases. Figure 1 illustrates the research model: 
!  
Figure 1. Model of influence of the Georgian and Moldovan dissident regions 
The model reveals the dependent and independent variables. The dependent variables 
are the “Rapprochement of the Republic of Moldova towards the European Union” and the 
“Rapprochement of Georgia towards the European Union”. The independent variables 
concerning Moldova are the “Autonomous Territorial Unit of Gagauzia” and the 
“Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic” (Transnistria) and, for Georgia, the “Republic of 
Abkhazia”. As mentioned earlier the most important concepts are “Rapprochement towards 
the European Union” and “Dissident Region”. The concepts are both explained extensively at 
the theoretical framework.  
2.2 Case Selection 
 The cases to be researched are Abkhazia, Transnistria, and Gagauzia, of which the 
latter is the main case since the initial question is whether Gagauzia influences the Moldova 
EU rapprochement. Gagauzia was chosen as the main case because it is poorly covered in 
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contemporary academic literature and because it gained my personal attention. Many scholars 
have stated that Gagauzia might be the next Crimea or Abkhazia and that the regio has an 
important, or even decisive, role in Moldova. I would like to discover whether these 
statements are true or just rough speculation.  
Figure 1 shows South Ossetia connected to Georgia with a dotted line. This region 
will not be used as a case due to the maximum allowed length of this thesis. Specifically 
South Ossetia is excluded because, as a case, Abkhazia has more similarities with Transnistria 
and Gagauzia such as the level of openness, Russian interference, violence, and international 
attention. Secondly, Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are absent in the figure. Although they 
have dissident regions on their territories, they will not be part of this thesis because these 
nations do not have the same level of European involvement and rapprochement as Georgia 
and Moldova. Ukraine’s dissident regions, Luhansk and Donetsk, are excluded because they 
are at war, which means the situation is heavily subjected to change.  
2.3 Data Collection & Methods 
 To understand the political perspectives of Abkhazia, Transnistria and Gagauzia a 
historical overview combined with a brief explanation of the current political climate is 
provided. Next to this also a brief historical overview of the EU rapprochement of both 
Moldova and Georgia are outlined in the theoretical framework. The topics mentioned 
indicate a qualitative nature, quantitative research towards the influence of dissident regions 
is difficult since this method often includes questionnaires, numbers, and statistics and use a 
larger sample size, this is less applicable to a research with just three cases. The qualitative 
method fits best because it is identified with in-depth interviews, literature research, and a 
small number of cases. During the theoretical framework review, data is collected by 
analyzing and summarizing primary and secondary sources. Primary sources are of 
importance because these sources are not subjected to interpretation and qualification.  
As mentioned, Gagauzia is the primary case in this thesis and will be analyzed more 
extensively during this thesis. Both Abkhazia and Transnistria function as control variables.  
Citations and information gained from in-depth interviews with the people listed in Table 1 
will be included during the forthcoming chapters. Some interviewees are not mentioned by 
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name because of the institution’s policies or personal preferences. Therefore, these people 
will be referenced by a pseudonym.   
Table 1. Interviewees 
2.4 Generalisation 
 The results of this thesis wil be hard to generalize with other dissident regions because 
most them have different characteristics such as political orientation, historical background 
and different actors involved. The results of this thesis might be applicable to the regions 
Luhansk, Donetsk, Crimea, South Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh. Results may differ but the 
overall scope will remain similar. A reason for this is that these regions have much in 
common when it comes to political orientation and historical background such as:  
• An aversion to both the EU and the sovereign nation 
• A high level of Russification 
• A recent history in violent secession (succeeded or not) 
• A characterization as dissident region within its sovereign state.  
The outcome of the same research to these regions will probably give the same answer to the 
same research question if one uses cases other than Gagauzia, Abkhazia, or Transnistria. This 
is important because there are different dissident regions around this globe, such as Catalonia, 
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Tibet, or Balochistan, but they do not have the same similarities as the primary cases of this 
thesis. Therefore, generalization on these dissident regions will be hard or even impossible.  
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3. Theoretical framework 
 In order to create cohesion between the concepts and variables it is essential to 
provide a framework that ensures correct understanding the predominating concepts: 
“dissident regions” and “rapprochement towards the European Union”. A theoretical 
framework should function the following way (University of Southern California 2018):  
A theoretical framework consists of concepts and, together with their definitions 
and reference to relevant scholarly literature,  existing theory that is  used for a 
particular study. The theoretical framework must demonstrate an understanding of 
theories and concepts that are relevant to the topic of a research paper and that 
relate to the broader areas of knowledge being considered. 
In the next section, the different perspectives about dissident regions are explained and 
weighed against each other, followed by an explanation on how dissident regions influence 
policies or states, and what the specific concepts are and how they are related.
 Dissident regions do not originate without any incidents or circumstances in the past. 
To understand the different dissident regions it is important to have a short historical 
overview of the specific regions in order to understand the context of their current dissidence. 
Therefor this theoretical framework provides the reader with a short historical overview of the 
regions Gagauzia, Transnistria, Abkhazia, but also the relations between the EU and both 
Moldova and Georgia.  
3.1 Rapprochement towards the European Union 
 As mentioned earlier rapprochement is preferred over integration since this term is 
more related to increased cooperation among EU member states. Georgia and Ukraine are 
both not a member state, it is therefor better to use the word rapprochement. This term is best 
defined the following way (Collins Dictionary 2018): 
 A rapprochement is an increase in friendliness between two countries, groups, or 
people, especially after a period of unfriendliness.  
This definition indicates that two actors develop their diplomatic relations and activities. It 
also mentions that there could be a period of unfriendliness prior to the period of 
rapprochement. In the cases of Georgia and Ukraine there are no recent detectable periodes of 
unfriendliness. Another definition of rapprochement is (Macmillan Dictionary 2018):  
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 The development of greater understanding and friendship between two countries 
or groups.  
This definition is in line with the previous one and also indicates that two actors develop their 
mutual activities and relations. The other resemblance between the two definitions is the fact 
that it is an ongoing process, rapprochement aims at a constant process of improving mutual 
relations.  
 Rapprochement is one part of the definition, the other part is the EU aspect of it. 
Using the previously mentioned definitions, EU rapprochement is an increase of mutual 
relations, greater understanding and friendship between the European Union and the non-
member state. This increase in friendship and mutual relations come along with different 
policies of the EU towards this non-member state but also from the non-member state 
towards the EU. A good example of EU rapprochement between e.g. Ukraine and the EU is 
the Association agreement. In this agreement both parties agreed to align economic, trade and 
legislative policies and to intensify bilateral relations. Besides the AA there are more 
examples of EU rapprochement from EU side, such as: visa-free travel, financial assistance 
for non-member states or the Instrument for pre-accession Assistance. The other way around 
are e.g. diplomatic representation of a non-member state at the European Union, adopting 
policies agreed upon in the treaties and cooperation on justice, liberty and security. EU 
rapprochement is a concept coming from both the EU as the non-memberstate.  
3.2 Dissident regions 
 Dissident regions have several similarities with de facto states. A de facto state 
operates as a normal state but lacks international recognition, though it has effective control 
over its territory and is capable of providing governmental services (Pegg 1998, 1). The 
definition of a de-facto state is applicable to Transnistria and Abkhazia but only partially to 
Gagauzia. Gagauzia is able to provide governmental services, but effective control is still 
provided by Moldova. Gagauzia is internationally recognized as an autonomous republic 
within Moldova. In general, autonomous republics are somewhat secluded from their 
sovereign state but still willing to cooperate, adopt national policies, and remain within the 
sovereign state.  
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 Since Gagauzia is not a de-facto state, a definition that fits Abkhazia, Transnistria, and 
Gagauzia is necessary. One of the main characteristics of a dissident region is a poor relation 
with the sovereign state and vice versa, this seems logical but it is vital for the understanding 
of the relation between the region and the sovereign state (McLaughlin 2003). The divergence 
between the state and the dissident region is the following (McLaughlin 2003): 
As sovereign actors, states exercise supreme authority within the international 
system and therefore are free to formulate domestic policies and conduct official 
relations with other states. Non-state (dissident) actors have no such official 
powers and ultimately come under the sovereign jurisdiction of one or more 
states. This means that all non-state actors, be they dissident or not, are subject, 
theoretically at least, to the power of states.  
Thus, dissident actors theoretically fall under the control of the state. They are dissident 
because they resist most policies. Resistance complicates the relationship between both actors 
and often damages and embarrasses the leading position of the sovereign state and other hand 
strengthens the position of the dissident region (McLaughlin 2003). Resistance can be divided 
in violent protests, such as riots, revolution, and anti-establishment actions, and non-violent 
examples, such as strikes, demonstrations, and referenda, like the one organized in Gagauzia 
(Peters 2016, 21). As Shellman explains, a dissident region will do almost everything in its 
power to achieve the goals it pursues; violence can be included but is not a necessity (Peters 
2016, 21). Furthermore, Shellman emphasizes governments will oppose policies from the 
dissidents and vice versa. According to McLaughlin the main characteristics are the following 
(Peters 2016, 21):  
Regardless of the focus and the means of political opposition, dissident groups 
are inherently revisionist and challenge state power …. Theoretically, the 
sovereign power of states is supreme. In reality, non-state dissident actors seek 
to challenge this sovereign authority through political action. A balance of power 
therefore exists within states, pitting the relative strengths of states and non-state 
dissidents against each other. 
The quotation above shows a rather theoretical aspect of dissident actors. Peters adds to 
McLaughlin’s explanation that dissidence is associated with freedom of speech movements 
anti-establishment thoughts and often leads to (violent) protest and revolution. The cases in 
!12
this research differ in their actions: Abkhazia and Transnistria were more revolutionary; 
Gagauzia is more non-violent. This difference is explained by both Peters and Shellman. The 
latter emphasizes that dissidence is often a consequence of the rational behavior of 
individuals or leaders of the group since they base their argumentation and goals on day to 
day business (Peters 2016, 21). Peters clarifies the resistance of dissident actors in the 
following way (2016, 21): 
Dissent is structurally or formally enabled in political systems through 
opposition parties often accompanied by social or political activism and forms of 
civil disobedience organized by those called “dissidents”. 
Thus, the dissidence is structural and, therefore, will always remain hard to overrule. The 
cases in this thesis have a few elements in common:  
1. Their affection towards their sovereign state 
2. Their challenge of state power 
3. Their threat or use of violence in their struggle for ideals and perspectives  
4. Their existence primarily due to Russia 
5. Their location on former Soviet territory.   
3.2.1 Influence of dissentient regions 
 Dissident regions are often dissatisfied with their actual situation since they feel 
disadvantaged by the state on several aspects e.g. in receiving a fair share of the national 
budget or receiving the necessary attention with regard to internal struggles. Rosecrance 
researched dissidence and concluded that regional dissatisfaction can lead into two directions. 
The first direction is greater dependence on the metropolitan government and acceptance of a 
lesser important status, which means accepting subordination to the state (Rosecrance & Stein 
2006, 4). The second direction concerns further distance from the state or even independence, 
which will only be successful if the international community recognizes this independence 
(Rosecrance & Stein 2006, 4). If the international community does not recognize this region, 
it will have severe consequences for its economy. Abkhazia and Transnistria are examples of 
a lack of recognition by the international community and a stalled economy. Moore argues 
that dissident actors do almost everything in their power to convince the sovereign state of its 
goals (Shellman & Moore 2003, 10):  
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Hostile state (dissident) actions include any public actions that meet at least one 
of these two criteria: (1) advance the state’s (dissident’s) goals at the expense of 
the dissident’s (state’s) goals or (2) degrade the dissident’s (state’s) ability to 
realize its goals. 
The quote above explains the fact that dissident regions will try to ensure their goals at the 
expense of the sovereign state, on the other hand the sovereign state will also try to prevent 
the dissident region achieving its goals. According to Wielgohs and Pollack, there are also 
external factors that play a role in the rise and presence of dissident actors (Wielgohs & 
Pollack 2004, 41):  
The level of fragmentation of the regime elites as well as the mobilization of the 
populations decisively influenced the mode of regime change and thereby defined 
the frame within which the opposition could act.  
Dissident regions often rise because the cohesion and connection with the sovereign state and 
the central government is inadequate or absent. Abkhazia and Transnistria arose because the 
Georgian and Moldovan state were weak. Currently, according to IRI polls, the Georgian 
government is strong but the Moldovan government weak, which is represented by low 
government confidence (International Republican Institute 2017a). This low confidence in the 
Moldovan government is one of the reasons dissidence could rise in Gagauzia.   
!14
!  
Figure 2. Location and names of the East European dissident region 
3.3 The dissident regions
This paragraph places an emphasis on the recent history of the different dissident regions. It is 
important to provide a short overview on recent history since different elements of their 
dissidence are to be found here.  
3.3.1 Abkhazia
 Abkhazia, a region in western Georgia, proclaimed independence after a bloody war 
from 1992 to 1993. Abkhazia is a dissident region and only recognized by Russia, Nicaragua, 
Venezuela, and Nauru. The map below shows that Abkhazia shares a short border with 
Georgia and a longer border with Russia. 
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Figure 3. Map of Abkhazia (Mapsland 2017) 
After the fall of the SU, the Abkhaz declared they wanted control over their own 
institutions within a Georgian confederation, a claim not heard by the Georgians who stated 
that Abkhazia had always been a part of Georgia. Therefore, a confederation was not 
necessary. This tone widened the distance between the Georgians and the Abkhaz. On April 9, 
1991, Georgia, including Abkhazia and South Ossetia, declared itself independent. Georgia 
promised Abkhazia and South Ossetia they would receive autonomy in the near future. Soon 
after the independence, the Georgian political elite, bolstered by nationalist feelings, saw both 
regions as a threat, and now that Georgia had loosened itself from the SU, it could determine 
what to do with these minorities. It withdrew Abkhaz and South Ossetian autonomy promises 
(Coppetiers 2004, 4-5).  
The year 1991 came to an eruption when the Abkhaz parliament passed the resolution 
to restore the Abkhaz constitution of 1925, making it a sovereign republic (Coppetiers 2004, 
4-5). The implementation of this resolution led to a full ground war between Georgia and 
Abkhazia, which started on August 14, 1992. The war resulted in (Zemskov-Züge 2015, 2): 
•  Abkhazia not receiving its independence 
• A frozen conflict on Georgian soil 
• Over a thousand people killed 
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• 240,000 internally displaced people 
• 8000 heavily wounded people  
That this conflict remains a status quo is mostly due to Russia, a state that initially 
fulfilled a role as peacekeeper. But this role eventually changed to guardian of an Abkhaz 
state. The situation between Georgia and Abkhazia did not change and became known as a 
frozen conflict. Between 2004 and 2008, the situation became tense again. Saakashvili tried 
to appease the situation by offering ‘special statuses in a potential federation’ to both dissident 
regions. This offer was rejected, and the status quo remained (American Progress 2011). At 
the same time, the relationship with Russia worsened due to Georgian rapprochement with 
NATO and close military cooperation with the US. In August 2008, Russia entered Georgian 
territory to protect Russian civilians in South Ossetia. During this war, the focus was mainly 
on South Ossetia, Abkhazia was saved at first instance. Though on August 10, Russian troops 
entered Abkhazia and continued their march up to Tbilisi. Two days later a ceasefire was 
signed, followed by Russian recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (American Progress 
2011).  
Over the past years, the situation in Abkhazia remained roughly the same; an example 
of this is the large focus on Russia. This closer cooperation resulted in a large Russian 
military build-up in Abkhazia. Markedonov emphasizes that the current Abkhaz political elite 
is not focussed on Georgia, it is more concerned about the potential danger of the ethnical 
balance shift (American Progress 2011). This ethnical balance is disturbed by Abkhaz citizens 
whom easily obtain Russian citizenship due to the, later explained, passportization. 
Nowadays most Abkhaz have Russian passports which means that the Russian nationality is 
now leading in Abkhazia (American Progress 2011). The fear of a disturbed ethnical balance 
is also represented by polls that emphasize the people’s wishes. Figure 4 portrays the 
fluctuation (Shevchenko & Tekushev 2013). 
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Figure 4. Poll indicating the opinions about the future of the Abkhaz state 
In 2016, the Medium Orient Information Agency conducted a poll with similar results 
reflecting Markedonov’s information (Caucasus times 2016). The Abkhaz citizens are more 
focussed on their own state than on joining Russia.  
3.3.2 Transnistria 
 Transnistria, known as Pridnestrovia, is a dissident region in Eastern Moldova and one 
of two dissident regions on Moldova’s territory. The history of Transnistria is turbulent due to 
a violent conflict in the early ’90s. The first establishment of a Transnistrian entity was during 
the formation of the Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR) in October 
1924. During WWII, the region became part of a newly established Moldovan Republic as 
determined by the Soviets. The Soviet occupation was shortly paused by occupation of the 
Axis powers, their main concern was Romanian oil used for the Nazi regime during their 
invasion of the SU (Preda 2013, 326-329). The occupation lasted until February 1947 when 
the parties signed the treaty of Paris and restored the territories (Vahl & Emerson 2004, 3-4). 
This period was followed by Sovietization with iron fist, resulting in 500,000 Moldovans 
being deported. Since Soviet military constructions were located in Transnistria, different 
workers, from all corners of the SU, came to Transnistria for work. This transferred the region 
into a successful and wealthy industrial region, which made Sovietisation popular in 
Transnistria (Vahl & Emerson 2004, 3-4). The other side of the Dniester River (Moldova) 
remained rural, and so divergence between Transnistria and Moldova developed.  
This divergence increase when the decay of the SU began. The decay influenced 
Moldova’s decisions; it became more nationalist. The Language Law, introduced on August 
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31, 1989, is an example of this increased nationalism. This law ensured Moldovan 
(Romanian), written in Latin, became the official state language. Russian became an 
unofficial language for interethnic communication (Vahl & Emerson 2004, 6). The law caused 
revolt in Transnistria; protests took place resulting in the Dniester Moldovan Republic 
proclaimed on September 2, 1990. The Transnistrian leaders argued their Russian speaking 
community was at danger and emphasized the Dniestrians were a separate ethnic community 
(Munteanu 2002, 212). The secession was broadly supported by the community, whom were 
widely anti-Moldovan/Romanian.  
Soon, the situation escalated, and militants created the Transnistrian Republican 
Guard (Vahl & Emerson 2004, 8). Using violence, the Guard took over several public 
institutions. The Guard expected a serious answer from the Moldovan government, but once 
again, it became obvious that Transnistrian forces were strong and motivated and the 
Moldovan army badly equipped and trained (Vahl & Emerson 2004, 8).  
The actual war took place from March 1992 until June 1992. In just four months, hundreds of 
people lost their lives (Vahl & Emerson 2004, 6-8). The war ended after the stationing of the 
Russian 14th army, who ended the intense fights around Bender (Moldovan side of the 
Dniester)  and drove the Moldovans out (Munteanu 2002, 216). A peace agreement was 2
signed at July 21, in this agreement the parties agreed on a 10-km wide demilitarized zone 
and an emphasized on a possible special status for Transnistria within or outside the 
Moldovan Republic (Vahl & Emerson 2004, 10). The ceasefire also included the stationing of 
6000 peacekeepers (Russian), of which 1500 are still present in Transnistria (Vahl & Emerson 
2004, 10). The situation in Transnistria did not changed afterwards; different peace processes 
have taken place but none actually visibly contributed to conflict settlement. There are 
multiple reasons why conflict solutions failed, such as lack of willingness and Russian 
military presence. 
Transnistria is strongly connected to Russia. For example, the 2006 referendum about 
its secession contained two questions: “Do you support the course of Transnistrian 
independence and joining the Russian Federation?” and “Do you favour the rejection of the 
independence of Transnistria and subsequent reunification with Moldova?” (Finley 2006). 
 Bender is a city which lies on the Moldovan side of the Dniestr but still ‘belongs’ to the Transnistria de facto 2
republic. 
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The results of this referendum were obvious: 94.6% voted against joining Moldova and 
97.1% voted in favour of Transnistrian independence and joining the Russian Federation 
(Dembinska & Iglesias 2013, 423). The results show Russia has a major linkage with the 
region, which contributes to the fact that Russia is not interested in reunification or conflict 
settlement between Moldova and Transnistria. As long as the status quo remains, Russia 
influences an important piece of geopolitics in the south-eastern Europe, which might create 
instability and can affect the nations around (Sanchez 2009, 160).  
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Figure 5. Map of Transnistria (Sdelano v Pridnestorvia 2014) 
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Figure 6. Map of Gagauzia (Gagauzia-Vin 2015) 
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3.3.3 Gagauzia 
 Gagauzia has a special autonomous status within Moldova. The 160,000 (4.5% of the 
complete Moldovan population) inhabitants of the autonomous entity are originally Turkish 
speaking with an Orthodox Christian religion (Calus 2014). These 4.5% possess 5% of the 
total Moldovan territory (Calus 2014). Although the origins of Gagauzia lay within the 
Turkish ethnic hemisphere, the political focus is Russian oriented (Calus 2014). Gagauz speak 
mostly Gagauz and Russian; most inhabitants do not speak Romanian, although this is the 
official Moldovan state language. It is obvious this language difference creates major 
problems, and a loss of connection with the rest of Moldova. Scholars like Popsoi, Calus, 
Haines, Roper, and Secrieru contributed to the current state of knowledge about this region, 
but as mentioned, Gagauzia is poorly covered by contemporary academic literature.  
The economy of this small autonomous republic is characterized by problems and 
ineffectiveness because it had to deal with political tensions, as well as natural difficulties 
(Bulut 2016, 65). According to Bulut, there are three reasons for this weak performance 
(2016, 67):  
• Importers and producers have no legal opportunities to create long-term contracts 
with companies abroad; 
• The commercial services are limited;  
• The lack of an independent service sector 
The effects of these problems are represented in Table 2, which show Gagauzia’s economic 
contribution is low. 
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Table 2. Average economic contribution per Moldovan region (Bulut 2016, 67) 
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The overall conclusion is that the Gagauz economic situation is worrisome and unstable due 
to poor support of the central government.  
The Moldova-Gagauzia issue started around the same period as the Transnistrian 
issue: after the introduction of the Moldovan language law . During the 19th century, the 3
Soviet domination issued special rights to Gagauz settlers, such as low taxes and no military 
service obligation. Therefore, Russian domination in Gagauzia was seen as acceptable. The 
period of Russification was followed by Romanisation, a hard and complete opposite 
domination for the Gagauz people. This made the Gagauz fondly remember the Russian rule 
and opposing Romanian domination (Chinn & Roper 1998, 89). During the last years of the 
SU, the MSSR received more space to implement its own policies (Chinn & Roper 1998, 90). 
One of these policies was to accentuate Moldovan culture and language, which resulted in 
alienation because Gagauz had little knowledge of the Moldovan language, as represented in 
Table 3.  
Table 3. Language possession Gagauzia in 1998 (Chinn & Roper 1998, 91) 
 This law ensured that Moldovan (Romanian) became the official state language written in Latin. Russian 3
became an un-official language for interethnic communication
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The Gagauz alienation resulted in dissatisfaction and indifference, which indirectly 
led the autonomy it has today. According to Chinn and Roper, the final push in this process of 
diversification was given by a Moldovan parliamentary report, which classified Gagauz 
civilians as an ethnic minority rather than indigenous people (1998, 92). Zabarah, on the other 
hand, refers to the language law as reason for escalation of Moldova-Gagauz relations. The 
law made Moldovan the official state language and simultaneously acknowledged that its 
identity was connected with Romania. All the other languages, most importantly Russian, 
became secondary languages (Zabarah 2012, 184). The reaction to these nationalist measures 
was a proclamation of the Gagauz Independent Republic in September 1989 (Roper 2001, 
105). According to Chinn and Roper, the Gagauz were not in search of independence because 
they knew Gagauzia would not survive as a state. Their hidden aim was autonomy, an aim 
appealing to the Moldovan government. The central government noticed that the Gagauz 
province was poorly developed and completely alienated from the Moldovan state due to the 
Russification (Chinn & Roper 1998, 94). Therefore, the Moldovan government was willing to 
meet certain demands of the Gagauz Halki .  4
Despite initial plans to safeguard autonomy, local Gagauz elections resulted in a 
strong nationalist Stepan Topal, chosen as Gagauz governor on December 1, 1991. Topal was 
more in favour of military actions, such as in Transnistria, resulting in the creation of Gagauz 
paramilitary formations, comparable to the Transnistrian Republican Guard, which attacked 
certain administrative offices, with casualties as a consequence (Chinn & Roper 1998, 96). 
Gagauzia was the first of both to declare its independence, but it was rather unsuccessful in 
pursuing it. While Transnistria actually used military means to ensure its independence, 
Gagauzia lacked economic and military capabilities to secure this. Compared with 
Transnistria, Gagauzia had no meaningful industries, it leaned on agriculture, and was 
dependent on Moldova's economic support (Roper 2001, 118). This made the region 
unattractive for (foreign) investors.  
The negotiations between Moldova and Gagauzia led to an agreement in which 
Gagauzia gained a certain amount of autonomy. At the same time, the agreement had to be a 
precedent for Transnistria in the hope that, by offering autonomy, the region would also join 
Moldova (Chinn & Roper 1998, 96). Gagauz autonomy became official when the Moldovan 
 The Gagauz Halki is the Gagauz separatist movement4
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parliament approved the autonomy law on Gagauzia (’94 law). This law established 
recognition of Gagauzia as an autonomous republic, called the Gagauz Yeri , and a special 5
status concerning self-determination (Roper 2001, 96). The ‘94 law contains the important 
sentence: “Gagauzia is an autonomous territorial unit with a special status for self-
determination of the Gagauz people.” (Chinn & Roper 1998, 98) 
In theory, Moldova recognizes the Gagauz people, culture, economy, and its political 
system. The Gagauz autonomy became a component of the Constitution of Moldova (Chinn 
& Roper 1998, 98). Article 1 (4) is another major paragraph referring to the powers of 
Gagauzia (Chinn & Roper 1998, 98): “In case of a change of the Republic of Moldova's status 
as an independent state, the Gagauz people have the right to external self-determination.” 
This part of the law is essential because Gagauzia feared Moldova would join Romania one 
day, resulting in another Romanification and discrimination. Therefore, Gagauzia can declare 
its independence if Moldova unites with Romania.  
Article 3 stresses the language issues; it recognizes three official languages for 
Gagauzia, namely Moldovan, Gagauz, and Russian, of which Moldovan and Russian are used 
as official public administrative languages (Chinn & Roper 1998, 98). Articles 7 and 14 
describe the political situation in Gagauzia: the assembly is the designated Gagauz 
representative authority and is elected every four years with at least one deputy per locality 
(Chinn & Roper 1998, 99). The Baskan is the chief executive for four years and part of the 
Moldovan Cabinet lead by the President of Moldova (Chinn & Roper 1998, 99).  
Over the years Moldova rapproached towards the EU. Not surprisingly, Gagauzia did 
not favour this path, and so Formuzal submitted the proposal for a consultative referendum on 
the direction of Moldova's foreign policy in October 2013 (Calus 2014, 4). The referendum 
was set for February 2, 2014 and questioned two issues, the foreign policy of Moldova and 
renewed emphasis on article 1 (4) of the ‘94 law. The results and questions of the referendum 
are presented in Table 4 (Severin & Shary 2014).  
 The Gagauz Yeri means land of the Gagauz5
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Table 4. Results and questions of the 2014 referendum in Gagauzia 
The turnout was above 70%, and no violations occurred. According to Formuzal, the 
referendum should be implemented in the following way (RadioFreeEurope 2014): 
We do not want to suffer, we want free markets in both Europe and the Russian 
Federation. We, Gagauzians, a small minority, are telling the central government 
-- stop all processes of political integration with the EU- take care about economic 
integration. Who can guarantee that we will manage to jump on the last cart of the 
train speeding towards Europe and the EU will not end up like the Soviet Union?  
The Governor’s statement explains the results of the referendum. Gagauzia prefers to 
integrate into both the EAEU and the EU economically but not politically. According to 
Beyer and Wolff, the referendum showed the EU and pro-European policies have problems 
gain a foothold in the region. Beyer and Wolff indicate European representation and attention 
needs to be improved in order to move Gagauzia onto the European track (Beyer & Wolff 
2016). Minzarari explains the referendum as ammunition for Russia since this country can 
use this popular will, the overwhelming results of the referendum, to tell the Moldovan 
government it should listen to the will of the people (Minzarari 2014). Additionally, Minzarari 
research explains the dilemma of the Moldovan government with regard to the crisis in 
Gagauzia (Minzarari 2014):  
The Gagauz referendum and the consequent central authorities’ inactivity may 
have forced the Moldovan government into a critical stalemate: it could face risky 
protests if it prevents further referendums, but it may also risk further protests if 
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the government allows such votes on Moldova’s foreign policy orientation to 
accumulate. 
Altogether the situation in Gagauzia remains unsolved and the region seems to be restless. In 
view of the quote above, neither Gagauzia nor Moldova will contribute actively to improve 
bilateral relations. 
 3.4 Moldova and the European Union
 EU-Moldova relations originated in 1991, just after Moldova’s independence. 
According to Danii and Mascauteanu, the relations between the EU and Moldova can be 
divided into three sections. The first section covers the period of Moldovan independence up 
to 1998. These seven years can be characterized by the Partnership and Co-operation 
Agreement (Minzarari 2014), focussed on establishing a partnership and promoting trade, 
investment, and a harmonious economic relationship. The Agreement provided a basis for 
legislative, economic, financial, social, and cultural cooperation and developed the Moldovan 
economy into a market economy (European Union 1994). Due to lacking diplomatic 
capabilities, Moldova did not succeed in accelerating and deepening the negotiations with the 
EU towards possible membership (Danii & Mascauteanu 2011, 101). Furthermore, the 
internal Moldovan situation changed: the communist party regained power.  
The second stage of EU-Moldova cooperation, from 1998 to 2005, is known for the 
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe and the launch of the European Neighbourhood 
Policy. The Stability Pact for Southeast Europe aimed to establish peace and security in 
Southeast Europe to prevent conflicts and ensure cooperation among the countries in the 
region. This lead to comprehensive measures for long-term stabilization, security, 
democratization, and economic reconstruction (Bendiek 2004, 14).  
Schmitke and Yekelchyk described two main goals of the ENP. The first was 
establishing good relations with countries around the EU, focussed on common values in 
fields relating to law, good governance, human rights, and economy (EEAS 2008) and to 
create an area of security and stability (Schmidtke & Yekelchyk 2008, 137). The second goal 
of the ENP focussed on promoting social and political change through financial aid, access to 
the EU market, and compliance with the standards of the EU. Crisis Group Europe 
emphasizes the ENP mainly focussed on integration concerning EU affairs: economy and 
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social structures, justice and home affairs, and the basic needs for an economy, such as 
transport, energy, and education. Additionally, the group also mentioned human rights, 
democracy, and Transnistria (EEAS 2004, 12): 
Sustained efforts towards a settlement of the Transnistria conflict, respecting the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Moldova within its 
internationally recognised borders, and guaranteeing respect for democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights.  
As the Crisis Group describes, not a lot of progress has been made on these issues mainly due 
to lacking administrative capacity (International Crisis Group 2006, 14-15).  
 The third stage covers 2005 up to today and concerns the EaP initiative and the 
Association Agreement. The Copenhagen Criteria, the criteria for EU membership, remain 
central in this period (Danii & Mascauteanu 2011,102). The EaP is mainly focused on 
building democratic institutions, intensifying economic cooperation, and establishing closer 
ties with the six countries in Eastern Europe (Park 2014). The EaP intensified cooperation on 
human rights and good-governance and often criticized because it treats each country with the 
same policies, a one-size-fits-all model. Moreover, Moldova especially was willing to invest 
in the EaP but was deceived when costly reforms were asked but EU membership was not a 
prospect (Danii & Mascauteanu 2011,102).  
The AA was the immediate cause for organizing a referendum in Gagauzia. Bulgari 
introduced a conception of the Association Agreement (2015, 41):  
The Association Agreement (AA) is an economic and political tool applied by the 
EU in order to develop its foreign policy and commercial relations with the 
neighbouring countries and implemented by the later in order to prosper and 
cultivate the EU core values. 
This definition explains the AA as an agreement to bring Moldova closer to the EU. However, 
unlike other agreements, the AA prescribed actual issued measures that need to be 
implemented. Along with the measures described, the market in Moldova should become 
more attractive for investors, leading to the “economic growth, jobs creation, prosperity and 
stability in the Republic of Moldova” (Bulgari 2014, 49). 
The way to generate these benefits is by reforming and modernizing all government 
sectors and, most importantly, harmonizing the national legislation with the acquis 
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communautaire (Bulgari 2014, 49). According to Montesano, vander Togt and Zweers, the 
AA needs to be improved to achieve this (2016, 1):  
In order to strengthen its profile and foster better implementation of the 
Association Agreement, the European Union (EU) needs to update its policies 
towards Moldova by means of a pragmatic mix of strict conditionality and 
strategic patience. While recent developments in the EU’s approach offer room for 
optimism, Moldova’s economic and political woes, coupled with the geopolitical 
sensitivity of the protracted Transnistrian conflict, require better investment and 
synergy of resources between the EU and its member states 
This is not the only critique the AA received. Putin and Dodon, President of Moldova, gave a 
joint press conference, where both were negative towards the AA. Putin mentioned the 
following (Kremlin 2017): 
There are certain risks for us, similar to the risks that we faced after a similar 
document was signed between Ukraine and the European Union. We said so 
openly and quite convincingly, I believe. We always said so to our partners in the 
CIS countries, and to our European partners. Much can and should be done in the 
trilateral format, of course, if our European friends and our partners (Moldova, I 
mean) are willing to do so 
The newly elected president of Moldova, Dodon, agreed with Putin (Kremlin 2017): 
I believe that the agreement has done Moldova no good. We have lost the Russian 
market and, strangely enough, our exports to the EU have also fallen. In other 
words, we have received nothing from signing the agreement 
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Figure 7. Share of Moldova's exports (Emerson & Cenusa 2017, 3) 
It is not remarkable that Dodon used these words since he campaigned to seek alliance 
with Russia. Still, exports to Russia declined, and as Figure 9 shows, exports to the EU 
increased. Nevertheless, Dodon requested the observer status of the EAEU, which according 
to Emerson and Cenusa, is economic suicide. Because it creates uncertainty for investors, 
European investors will leave, which means a loss within Moldova’s economy (Emerson & 
Cenusa 2017, 5-6). Furthermore, Scheffers emphasizes that Moldova should not forget it is 
the highest recipient of EU aid per capita after Palestine (Scheffers 2010, 296). Moldova 
joining the EAEU might have disastrous consequences for the signatory of the AA. 
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Figure 8. Moldova GDP annual growth rate (Trading Economics 2017) 
3.5 Georgia and the European Union
 The development of EU-Georgian relations are similar to those of Moldova and the 
EU; therefore, this paragraph will not dwell upon the years 1991 until 2008. This choice is 
strengthened by the fact that the policies during this period were not nation-state specific but 
aimed at a group of states; the intentions and effects were roughly the same.  
 In 2008, Georgia went through a difficult period: from August 7th till August 12th a 
war took place. This war occurred simultaneously with Georgia’s negotiations for closer 
cooperation with NATO and the EU; at that time, Georgia was part of the EU ENP program 
and the overal public support asked for more rapprochement with both the EU and NATO. 
The EU had no obligations to choose a position in this war, and so it remained vague 
regarding the events in Georgia. It was up to the member states individually to comment on 
the situation. Both France and Germany agreed the EU should be the “honest broker” in this 
conflict (Valasek 2008, 1). Other member states, such as Poland and Sweden, were more 
critical on Russian behavior; Slovakia, on the other hand, pointed the finger at Georgia 
(Valasek 2008, 1). This dividedness represents the position of the EU: it remained neutral 
because its member states could not agree how to act nor which side to choose. During the 
war and the period afterwards, the EU remained at the background; the only member state 
that involved itself was France, mostly as an intermediate power aiming to restore peace in 
the region. As Khidasheli and Valasek point out, Georgia engaged in many actions to help the 
EU, such as hosting a pipeline to ensure European energy needs, supporting EU member 
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states during the wars in Kosovo and Afghanistan, being loyal concerning EU policy 
implementation, and willing to undertake military and economic reforms in order to possibly 
join the alignments EU and NATO (Valasek 2008, 2). However, after the war, it became clear 
to Georgia that its support for both alignments was of little value, which created 
disappointment among the Georgian government and, above all, at the Georgian society. In 
their eyes, they heavily supported EU and NATO, unfortunately this was not rewarded during 
the war resulting into frustration and a loss of confidence in the actual power of both alliances 
to counter Russian aggression  (Khidasheli 2011, 101). 
Still, close cooperation between Georgia and the EU remained, and after three years of 
silence, an announcement was made: Georgia and the EU started negotiations for the AA, one 
of the most important agreements in EU integration with non-member states. The main aim of 
the AA was to improve Georgia’s economic policies. Like Moldova, Georgia also deals with 
dissident regions on its territory, which are hardly considered in the AA. To illustrate, 
Abkhazia is just mentioned twice (European Council 2014, 5):   
RECOGNISING the importance of the commitment of Georgia to reconciliation 
and its efforts to restore its territorial integrity and full and effective control over 
Georgian regions of Abkhazia and the Tskhnivali region/South Ossetia in pursuit 
of a peaceful and lasting conflict resolution based on principles of international 
law, and of the EU's commitment to support a peaceful and lasting resolution of 
the conflict 
Thus, the EU recognizes troubles in Georgia’s Western and Northern regions but does not 
give a conclusive solution to these regions’ problems, which is remarkable because the AA is 
known for its clear and decisive language, often providing directly implementable solutions, 
recommendations, and adjustments. The AA also mentions its policies are not applicable to 
Abkhaz territory since Georgia does not have effective control over the region (European 
Council 2014, 139). The relations with Abkhazia continued to be under pressure, especially 
after Russia signed an alliance and strategic partnership with Abkhazia at the same period as 
the AA (Farchy 2014). This agreement meant more military and economic support for 
Abkhaz, resulting in a worried and an angry response by Georgia.  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4. Analysis 
 Table 5. Answers and questions concerning the determination of influence 
This chapter includes the analysis of the three dissident regions with regard to their influence 
on EU rapprochement. The analysis is combined with an overview of answers from 
interviews with experts and related persons. As mentioned in the second chapter, Gagauzia is 
the main case of this thesis. To gain a broader picture of this region, I visited Moldova and 
interviewed people dealing with Gagauzia in their daily work and life. Every interviewee was 
asked the same questions. The most important answers are outlined in this section.  
 Both Transnistria and Abkhazia function control cases. The research question remains 
central in this analysis: Do the dissident regions Abkhazia, Gagauzia, and Transnistria 
influence the rapprochement of their sovereign state towards the European Union? Abkhazia 
and Transnistria are both discussed in many academic sources and journals. Gagauzia, on the 
other hand, is fairly unknown and not covered very well in academic literature. 
 This analysis was based on a model where questions are answered to determine 
whether influence of the dissident region exists or not. The questions were answered with yes 
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(✓) or no (X). The 11 questions per region clarify whether there is influence. In Table 5, the 
model is displayed.  
4.1. Does the EU recognize the dissident region? 
 As the model indicates, Abkhazia and Transnistria are not recognized by their 
sovereign state due to their violent secession in the early ‘90s. The EU has a non-recognition 
policy towards both dissident regions, which suggests that both belong to their sovereign state 
and peace should be restored (Fisher 2010): 
The EU Non-Recognition and Engagement Policy (NREP) aims at opening a 
political and legal space in which the EU can interact with the separatist regions 
without compromising its adherence to Georgia’s territorial integrity.  
This citation refers to the actual situation in Georgia but also in Moldova, the EU can interact 
with both regions but always without ensuring that the relations between the sovereign state 
and the EU are not damaged. Examples of these interactions are: de-isolations by seeking 
contact with the population and trustbuilding in order to increase leverage of the EU (Fisher 
2010). An example of specific measure of interaction could be granting visas to a number of 
inhabitants of the dissident region (Fisher 2010). All in all the EU will never damage it 
diplomatic relations by recognizing the dissident regions of both Georgia and Moldova as 
sovereign states.  
 Concerning Gagauzia, the facts are different. Gagauzia is recognized by the EU as an 
autonomous territorial unit within Moldova, regrettably this autonomy is poorly implemented 
by Moldova. The EU noticed Gagauzia became unstable during 2013 and 2014. In order to 
ensure that Gagauzia’s does not become as alienated as Transnistria and Abkhazia it 
addressed Moldova to respect the autonomy of Gagauzia (Vlah 2017) (Pistrinciuc 2017). The 
EU stressed Moldova to respect the autonomy of Gagauzia the following way (European 
Union 2017): 
We reiterate our commitment to strengthening the status of Gagauzia as an 
autonomous territorial unit. In this context, we call for the adoption of the 
amendments proposed by the Permanent Working Group on Co-operation 
between the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and the People’s Assembly 
of Gagauzia so that the 1994 Law on the Special Legal Autonomous Status of 
Gagauzia can be applied. 
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Table 6. Does the EU treat Gagauzia properly? 
 Besides pointing Moldova on respecting the autonomy of Gagauzia it also increased 
attention towards the region, recognized by all interviewees (Table 6). This increased 
attention is soft power, which are essentially financial resources. If the EU donates financial 
resources to the region, projects will originate, leading to increased visibility of the EU in 
Gagauzia. As Vitalli Vlah mentions, after the referendum in 2014, Gagauzia received 6.5 
million euros, and another five million euros will follow soon. Through this visibility, the EU 
receives more public support in Gagauzia. In the opinion polls conducted by Pilgrim Demo it 
became clear that support for the EU increased, now 12% of the population sees the EU as the 
actor which helps Gagauzia the most (Pilgrim Demo 2017). Over the past years this number 
was always much lower. Most interviewees also indicated that increased attention of the EU 
towards Gagauzia is a result of the referendum and skirmishes during 2013 and 2014.  
4.2 Did the sovereign state reduced its cooperation with the EU? 
 This second subquestion is important to ask since the answer will provide a better 
understanding of the real influence of dissident regions on EU rapprochement. It is quite clear 
that over the past years both Georgia and Moldova further increased their cooperation with 
the EU. The AA is the most important example of this increased cooperation. The signing of 
the AA can be seen as a great adaption to EU policies and structures. In addition to the AA, 
both states normally aim to increase cooperation. In the current period (2017-2020) 
cooperation between Moldova and Georgia will further increase due to the implementation of 
the DCFTA. This increased program, the Single Support Framework, will provide financial 
support and EU assistance on the following issues (EEAS 2017): 
1. Economic development 
2. Governance 
3. Connectivity 
4. Contacts between people 
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 Although the EU and Moldova increased cooperation, the current focus of the 
Moldovan government shifted from the EU to the EAEU, as can be read from the fact that 
Dodon asked for an observer status at the EAEU. According to earlier mentioned scholars this 
might result in an economic loss, investor pull out, instability, and most of all, an incomplete 
economic transition. Moldova is in the middle of a transition within the DCFTA. If it 
drastically stops the reforms, Moldova will be saddled with a partly reformed economic 
system. This will certainly not improve the economic situation of Moldova.  
 When it comes to Georgia, as mentioned, the cooperation between both actors did not 
decrease. On the contrary, cooperation between both increased rapidly. One of the examples is 
the visa liberalization for Georgian citizens in March 2017 but also the recent agreed 
increased cooperation in which both actors agreed on a financial allocation, between €371-
€453 million, in order to support Georgia’s technical and financial reforms. The difference 
between Moldova and Georgia is that the latter purely focusses on the EU and has no 
relations with the EAEU. An important similarity is their increased cooperation with the EU.   
4.3 Did the public opinion within this region towards the EU change over the past 
five years? 
 As table 5 indicates, the public opinion towards the EU changed only in Gagauzia. 
Within Abkhazia and Transnistria, public opinion remained unchanged; both regions solely 
focus on their main political partner, Russia. The prominent reason for the poor relations 
between the dissident regions and the EU is the non-recognition policy by the EU member 
states.  
 4.3.1 EU - Transnistria 
 Officially, the EU does not recognize, and does not have diplomatic relations, with 
Transnistria. Over the past years, some back channel diplomatic relations evolved due to 
conflict settlements, such as the Kozak Memorandum in which the EU played its part 
(Popescu 2006). Currently, the EU policies with regard to Transnistria concern reunification 
as to be derived from official documents (Racz 2016, 19): 
Peaceful re-unification with Transnistria is possible via the gradual, step-by-step 
transformation of the separatist region, as well as via making Moldova more 
attractive to the population of the separatist region. 
!37
EU officials see the Transnistrian conflict as solvable because currently violence is absent in 
this status-quo which enlarges to opportunities restore peace since violence will not be a game 
changer. To contribute to a solution, the EU (Racz 2016, 19): 
• Assists in bilateral (Moldova-Transnistria) meetings 
• Supports confidence building 
• Is an important actor in the 5+2 peace dialogue 
• Increases safety due to the EUBAM mission 
• Points out that Transnistria violates human rights very often 
Although Transnistria and the EU do not have negligible diplomatic relations, Transnistria 
still largely depends on EU trade; 70% of Transnistrian exports are absorbed by EU member 
states (De Waal 2016). Still, public opinion is against the EU mainly due to the extensive 
Russian media coverage. 
The EU and Moldova do not have a clear plan on how to solve the Transnistrian 
conflict. According to Popescu and Litra, the EU most likely tries to influence the situation by 
reviving policies on Moldova, such as visa free travel, freedom and prosperity, and free trade. 
This should make Moldova wealthier and more attractive for Transnistrian citizens, which 
should temper Transnistrian-Russian accession feelings (Popescu & Litra 2012, 4). 
Eventually it should understood that the EU is the better option. According to Calus, there is 
no real evidence for a solution to this conflict because of the contradictory interests of both 
parties, the absence of internal pressure and the lack of interest within Transnistria (Calus 
2016, 81).  
4.3.2 EU - Abkhazia 
 Recently, the EU stressed its position concerning Abkhazia once again (EEAS 2017): 
[The EU] supports the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Georgia, as 
recognized by International Law. The European Union does not recognize the 
constitutional and legal framework in which these (Abkhaz) elections have taken 
place.  
This statement explains that the EU has absolutely no interest in recognizing the proclaimed 
Abkhaz independence and its political activities. This stance against Abkhazia originates from 
close EU-Georgia relations, which ensure a solid non-recognition position towards Abkhazia 
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(Clamadieu 2017). The EU sees Abkhazia as Russian occupied territory and urges Russia to 
reverse the recognition of both South Ossetia and Abkhazia (European Parliament 2011).  
Most Abkhaz see the EU as an ally of Georgia, focussed on restoring original borders. 
The Abkhaz public opinion does not concern restoring borders with Georgia, and so the 
Abkhaz believe the EU should stop trying to achieve this (Kvarchelia 2012, 7-8). The EU is 
seen as an organisation that does not respect Abkhaz independence, and therefore, Abkhazia 
remains hesitant with regard to cooperation with the EU as emphasized by a respondent of an 
EU-Abkhazia perceptions research (Kvarchelia 2012, 7-8): “Let them recognise us first. We 
are not going to be fooled by their ‘economic carrots’”.  
Relations between Abkhazia and the EU remain underdeveloped because of the non-
recognition policy. As long as the sovereign nation does not support the dissidents’ demands, 
the EU will not support them either. Abkhazia, on the other side, sees rapprochement with the 
EU as a risk because it might result in losing its proclaimed independence. 
4.3.3 EU-Gagauzia 
 Like Transnistria, Gagauzia’s geopolitical worldview has predominately a Russian 
focus, e.g. language and politics, which results in Gagauz citizens rejecting the EU and 
approving the EAEU. Although the Gagauz population voted against joining the EU, former 
Governor of Gagauzia, Mihail Formuzal, emphasized there was no general disapproval of 
European integration (European Economic and Social Committee 2014): 
The Gagauz population is not against European integration, but demands respect 
for autonomy, a fairer distribution of resources, including EU funds, a greater 
commitment to the fight against corruption in the country.  
 The EU’s policies towards Gagauzia are different from the ones focused on 
Transnistria, simply because Gagauzia is not a region that proclaimed its independence 
illegally. However, it can be seen as a dissident region because of its referendum, its anti-
Moldova behavior, and the difference in cultural aspects, such as language and cultural 
practices. Where the EU stressed Abkhazia and Transnistria to respect and restore the 
sovereignty of both Georgia and Moldova, it pressured Moldova to respect the autonomy of 
Gagauzia (European Union 2017): 
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We reiterate our commitment to strengthening the status of Gagauzia as an 
autonomous territorial unit. In this context, we call for the adoption of the 
amendments proposed by the Permanent Working Group on Co-operation 
between the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova and the People’s Assembly 
of Gagauzia so that the 1994 Law on the Special Legal Autonomous Status of 
Gagauzia can be applied. 
This was not the first time the EU issued an admonishment. On March 8, 2017, the European 
Commission emphasized that the AA would only work if it respected certain points regarding 
minorities, such as implementing the ‘94 law (EEAS 2017). 
 Both EU statements show the EU acknowledges the seriousness of the situation. As 
mentioned, Gagauzia organised a referendum where people were asked whether they would 
like Moldova to join the EU or the EAEU. The people of Gagauzia largely supported joining 
the EAEU. During the referendum in March 2014, support for the EU received only 2% of 
the votes; instead, people largely voted in favour of the EAEU. The EU started to pay more 
attention to Gagauzia after this referendum, by means of investments and different social en 
and economic projects (Vlah 2017). This resulted in increased popular support for the EU 
(Pilgrim Demo 2017): now, almost 12% of the Gagauz population see the EU as the important 
actor in Gagauzia. As the political officers of the EEAS and CEPS and Mihail Sirkeli 
indicate, the referendum influenced EU policies because it increased attention to Gagauzia 
(Vlah, 2017) (Sirkeli 2017) (Interviewee 6 2017). The EU certainly wants to prevent 
Gagauzia becoming another conflict zone, and therefore, it invests in the region. However, 
both statements were released after the events in 2014. So it can be concluded that the EU 
learned from ignoring dissident regions since they might create problems in the future. The 
EU, therefore, warned Moldova to respect the autonomy of Gagauzia. 
4.4 Did the public opinion within the sovereign state, towards the EU, change over 
the past five years? 
 4.4.1 Moldova 
 Figure 7 elaborates the current Moldovan thoughts about the EU and indicates the 
opinion on joining the EU is shared by 49% of the Moldovan population. The positive 
perspectives towards the EU shifted intensively over the years and are currently characterized 
by tough times. Figure 10 indicates support for the EU is drastically declining. The public 
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support for joining the EU was around 75% in 2007 but around 49% in October 2017, a 
decline of 26% over 10 years, besides this it has to be mentioned that the support was even 
lower two years ago. This decline in support comes along with the intensification of the 
relations between the EU and Moldova. Intensification does not immediately mean increased 
support, on the contrary, the fact that support in Moldova remains low has a lot to do with the 
fact that the EU can not fulfill the expectations of the people.  
Figure 9. Opinion poll results 2014-2017 concerning Moldova's economic alignment (International Republican 
Institute 2017a)  
!  
Figure 10. Public support in Moldova for joining the European Union (Montesano et al. 2016, 15) 
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These expectations have to do with direct solutions to e.g. corruption, poverty, low income 
and unemployment. People expected that closer alignment with the EU would solve these 
problems and that prosperity would follow automatically. Of course these expectations were 
high, too high. But still, according to a part of the parliamentarians and the inhabitants, the 
EU was to blame for ongoing internal struggles (Cenusa 2015). Furthermore, the overall trust 
in politicians is low and still decreasing, which is partly a result of the absence of the 
economic prosperity promised by the pro-EU politicians and EU officials. Besides the lack of 
fulfilling expectations the Pro-EU party is associated with multiple scandals, of which 
stealing one billion euros was the negative peak (Whewell 2015). 
 Figure 11. Georgia's EU support for the years 2013-2017 (International Republican Institute 2017b) 
4.4.2 Georgia
The results of the March 2017 opinion poll are displayed in Figure 11, below, and show large 
support for the EU. Unlike Moldova, Georgia’s support for the EU is stable and fluctuates 
around the 67% (Litra & Chkhikvadze 2016, 7). The public opinion in Georgia towards the 
EU remained relatively high and stable, mainly due to a prospering economy, stable internal 
situation and the lack of an alternative since Georgia has poor relations with Russia. The 
numbers concerning EU support remained more or less equal. In comparison with Moldova, 
Georgia goes through a stable and prosperous period, the economy grew and number 
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concerning corruption decreased. Next to this the current and former governments were able 
to tackle internal issues as corruption, pensions and unemployment successfully. Also the 
installation of the visa liberalization was welcomed profoundly and contributed to more 
support for the EU (Civil Georgia 2017). To conclude support for the EU in Georgia remained 
stable, in Moldova the support declined.  
4.5 Do the dissident regions benefit from closer cooperation between the sovereign 
state and the EU? 
 As determined in table 5 and to be explained in this paragraph, Abkhazia does not 
benefit from closer cooperation between Georgia and the EU. The most obvious reason for 
this conclusion is the fact that EU explicitly mentioned that its policies do no not cover the 
territory of Abkhazia (European Union 2014): 
The application of this Agreement, or of Title IV (Trade and Trade-related 
Matters) thereof, in relation to Georgia's regions of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali 
region/South Ossetia over which the Government of Georgia does not exercise 
effective control, shall commence once Georgia ensures the full implementation 
and enforcement of this Agreement, or of Title IV (Trade and Trade-related 
Matters) thereof, respectively, on its entire territory. 
Besides the fact that the EU explicitly mentions the exclusion of both Abkhazia and South 
Ossetia, as long as Georgia has no effective control, there are no further relations between 
Abkhazia and the EU. Not like Transnistria or Gagauzia, Abkhazia is virtually excluded from 
the rest of of the world except for Russia. The fact that Russia and Abkhazia share borders 
make that both can trade easily with each other. Through this way Abkhazia is not dependent 
on trade through Georgia, like Transnistria experiences with Moldova. 
 Both Transnistria and Gagauzia did benefit from Moldova signing the AA. After the 
signature, Gagauzia received an increase in funds, allowing the community of Comrat to 
build an industrial complex just outside the city centre (Anghelov 2017). Besides this 
industrial complex the EU made funds available for Gagauzia to stimulate the younger 
generation in opening new businesses in order to generate economic growth and prosperity in 
Gagauzia (Anghelov 2017). These mentioned examples are recently introduced, according to 
most interviewees this has to do with the fact that the EU just recently acknowledged the 
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importance of increase attention to this region (Interviewee 4 2017). This acknowledged 
importance is a result of the concerns with regard to the situation in Gagauzia around 
2013/2014.  
 As with Abkhazia, the AA is not applicable on Transnistrian territory as written down 
in article 462 of the AA (European Union 2014). The main difference between Abkhazia and 
Transnistria are the neighboring states which Transnistria borders namely Moldova and 
Ukraine, two countries with a strong EU connection. Russia is not a neighboring country and 
so direct trade with Russia remains hard. Transnistria is therefor forced to do business through 
Moldova or Ukraine. Most Transnistrian businesses are registered within Moldova, this ables 
the Transnistrian businesses to trade within Transnistria and Moldova but also to other nations 
(EUBAM 2015). Most Transnistrian companies benefited from the AA because, as 
mentioned, they are registered at the Moldovan entities and so they fall under the rules and 
instructions written down in the AA. Since the application of the AA Moldova’s economy 
lightly grew and so also the registered Transnistrian companies. The EU contains a huge part 
of the Transnistrian economical market: 70% of its exports go to EU member states (Waal 
2016).  
4.6 Is EU rapprochement the only reason for the region’s dissidence? 
 EU rapprochement is often not the primary reasons for regions’ dissidence. The reason 
for both Abkhazia’s and Transnistria’s dissidence is the disagreement about the political 
direction of the former Soviet republics in the early ’90s. As mentioned in paragraph 3.3.2, 
the Transnistrian leadership did not want to be part of a state in which Moldovan became the 
only state language and where Russian, the language spoken in Transnistria, became a 
secondary language. A large part of the Transnistrian community felt connected to the former 
Soviet, or contemporary Russian, community. This desire for being part of the Russian 
community and not being part of the Moldovan community, is the primary reason for 
Transnistrian dissidence. The EU rapprochement of Moldova is just an amplifier, it gives 
Transnistria only more reasons not to be part of the Moldovan Republic.  
 The situation of Transnistria is similar to the Abkhaz one. When the SU dissolved 
Abkhazia became part of Georgia, the newly founded government promised autonomy to 
Abkhazia. Soon it became clear for the Abkhaz that this autonomy was not a real option. The 
Abkhaz saw Georgian nationalism as a threat for their culture and language and so they tried 
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to secede. As with Transnistria, EU rapprochement is just an amplifier but not the primary 
reason for its dissidence. 
Table 8. How would you describe the current relationship between the Moldovan government and 
Gagauzia? 
 Gagauz dissidence originated similarly with the Transnistrian and Abkhaz dissidence 
but the Gagauz dissidence at that time seemed to be solved with a far reaching autonomy for 
the region in 1994. The current dissidence of Gagauzia is mostly concerned with the non-
implementation of this autonomy. Its current dissidence is strengthened by poor relations with 
the Moldovan government resulting in disadvantages and discrimination when it comes to 
language, ethnicity and budget distribution (de Waal 2016). All interviewees described the 
relation between Gagauzia and Moldova as stable but most completed the answer with a 
caveat.  
Table 9. What are Gagauzia’s major internal problems? 
The question concerning Gagauzia’s major internal problems make a few leitmotifs 
clear (Table 9). At first, the Gagauz feel disadvantaged with regard to their ethnicity, 
implementation of their autonomy and receiving a fair share of the annual budget. The first 
and the last points are specifically important. Currently the autonomy is not implemented in 
any way, completely against what both parties agreed upon in the peace agreement of 1994. 
People feel betrayed because they gave up violence and their independence-ideals for this 
autonomy. All interviewees indicate that this autonomy is in any way not implemented and so 
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just a farce. Additionally, the Gagauz receive less money from the state budget than they 
should according their population-size. Without the correct investments by the Moldovan 
government a large part of the population will remain poor and certainly politically 
unsatisfied. The third internal problem is the Russification, the Gagauz do not associate 
themselves with the EU and solely focus on Russia. Besides this the Gagauz do not get a fair 
and clear image of the EU since all media coverage is Russian oriented. Since Moldova is 
associated with the EU, and Gagauzia linked with Russia, a wedge between the two parties is 
created. Currently, relations are not under significant pressure, but all recognized that 
Moldova does not consider Gagauzia in its decision-making.  
The mentioned internal problems contribute to its dissidence and form the primary 
reasons for this dissidence. According to my findings, strengthened by the opinion of the 
interviewees, the referendum was a cry for attention (Anghelov 2017). EU rapprochement 
cannot be seen as a primary reason for its dissidence. Gagauzia, still not pro-EU, used the 
moment to express dissatisfaction about its poor situation. The CEPS analyst (interviewee 6) 
cites Gagauzia is subordinated, nevertheless relations improved due the referendum which 
functioned as a wakeup call.  
4.7 Is there a third party that could influence the relationship between the dissident 
region and the EU?  
 During this thesis another actor, besides the EU, Georgia or Moldova, was mentioned 
very often: the Russian Federation. All three dissident regions have good relations with 
Russia, most of the inhabitants nostalgically look back to the SU and in their contemporary 
politics, Russia still plays an important role as their patron or idealist motherland. Therefor 
Russia can be seen as a third party that influences the relationship between the dissident 
region and the EU.  
 4.7.1 Russia - Abkhazia 
Many scholars, like Gerrits and Bader, have emphasized an additional point to 
Russian-Abkhaz relations: Abkhazia, as well as South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh, and 
Transnistria, are vital for Russia’s geopolitical hemisphere (Gerrits & Bader 2016, 300). 
These dissident regions are dependent on Russia with regard to economy, culture, and 
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politics. Russia is the only nation with whom they have economic relations, and therefore, 
they do not just earn their money by cooperation with Russia, their political worldview is 
completely Russified (Gerrits & Bader 2016, 300). Conversely, the regions are important 
because, through these regions, Russia can influence the sovereign states. As long as they 
have a dissident region on their territory, it will remain difficult to align internationally with 
the EU or NATO, as explained by Bugajski (2012, 6): 
Moscow’s optimum objective is to neutralize Georgia, eliminate American 
influence, prevent any opening of Western military bases, curtail support for 
energy projects independent of Russia, and bring the entire South Caucasus 
more tightly under the Russian umbrella.  
According to Tsereteli, the internal conflicts influence Georgia’s current foreign 
policies mainly because of the Russian military presence in both dissident regions (Tsereteli 
2013, 231). According to Tsereteli, Georgia must normalize its relations with Russia. Tsereteli 
advises the following concerning Georgia (2013, 231): 
Georgia should not abandon its policies calling for the de-occupation of the 
Georgian territories, non-recognition of the separatist areas, and integration 
with NATO and the E.U. None of these policies preclude Russia from opening 
its market for Georgian products, nor do they presage more Russian military 
involvement in Georgia. 
If Georgia improves its relations with Russia, declining tensions between both will create 
chances to integrate further into the European and transatlantic world. If it does not, Abkhazia 
and South Ossetia will influence Georgia’s internal and foreign policies.  
 4.7.2 Russia - Transnistria 
As mentioned, 1500 “peacekeepers” of the Russian 14th army are stationed on 
Transnistrian soil, making it a sensitive issue for geopolitics. Wolff mentions three options for 
the territorial status of Transnistria with regard to Russia. First, muddling through, the current 
situation remains (2011, 865-866). The second is implementing parts of the peace settlements; 
one of the settlements is strong autonomy (Wolff 2011, 865-866). The last is the creation of a 
federation comparable to the United Kingdom or Denmark (Wolff 2011, 865-866). As 
mentioned, Russia will play an important role in conflict settlement. To maintain influence, 
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Russia will keep its “peacekeepers” or military personnel in regions like Transnistria, 
Abkhazia, and South Ossetia to (Gerrits & Bader 2016, 229-230), according to Sanchez, 
counter the influence of the US and NATO (2009, 172). Beyer and Wolff mention the conflict 
between Moldova and Transnistria is stuck because all actors have completely opposing 
interests. Furthermore, Moldovan weaknesses, such as: decline in economic capabilities, 
internal unrest, corruption, and a diffused political system, make it hard for Moldova to 
strongly counter the dissidence of Transnistria. Moldova seems handicapped with these 
problems (Beyer & Wolff 2016, 349). 
 4.7.3 Russia - Gagauzia 
For a long time Russia remained reluctant with regard to Gagauzia, the relations 
between Gagauzia and Russia were diplomatically and economically underdeveloped. Russia 
lacked interest in Gagauzia because it was not of significant geopolitical importance to Russia 
(Chinn & Roper 1998, 97). The Russian reluctance also influenced the negotiations between 
Gagauzia and Moldova at the first years of the nineties. Moldova’s position was stronger in 
Gagauzia because here it did not fear any Russian involvement, as was the case in 
Transnistria.  
In the years afterwards the situation Russian interest grew and both were looking for 
political en economical rapprochement. In 2013 and 2014, both Moldova and Gagauzia were 
on rampage. At that time, about 100 Gagauz went to Russia for paramilitary training in 
Moscow (Secrieru 2014, 5). At the same time, relations between Russia and Gagauzia 
intensified with fortified contacts with the Russian ambassador and Mihail Formuzal, the 
former Bashkan of Gagauzia . Promises were made to Gagauzia that Russia would watch the 6
implementation of Gagauz autonomy (Secrieru 2014, 5). 
According to Calus, there are multiple reasons for the pro-Russian vote (2014, 7): 
• Russian ban on Moldovan alcoholic products did not apply to Gagauzia (Rusila 
2014) 
• Gagauz migrant workers all go to Russia  
• Russia is the main language in Gagauzia 
• Gagauz have hardly any knowledge about the EU.  
 The Bashkan is the governor of Gagauzia6
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During these tense years, Russia started to pay more attention to Gagauzia; it became a gift 
for Russia to enlarge its influence in Moldova during its European rapprochement.  
The ultimate solution for Russia would be a federation in which Gagauzia, 
Transnistria, and Moldova form one state. In this federation, the Pro-Russian (autonomous) 
republics Gagauzia and Transnistria would have a large amount of influence because their 
representatives would then be a part of the Moldovan government and so directly involved in 
the decision-making (Calus 2016, 74). Currently, the Gagauzian governor is part of the 
government, but since the autonomy of Gagauzia is poorly implemented, the governor’s role 
is rather small. 
  
 4.7.4 Passportization 
Over the past ten years Russia started to issue Russian passports to the citizens of both 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia; approximately 80% of Abkhaz citizens hold Russian passports. 
The issuing of Russian passports is one of the major measures for Russia to gain control over 
the dissident regions. Russia issuing passports to citizens of the two dissident regions has two 
benefits, according to Gerrits and Bader (2016, 303): 
First, it is seen as an effective means to strengthen the loyalty of Abkhazian and 
South Ossetian citizens to Russia and by extension to weaken their affiliation to 
Georgia. Moreover, the issuing of passports has made it possible for Russia to 
invoke a responsibility-to-protect argument, as it did during the conflict with 
Georgia in August 2008. 
The passportization was one of the reasons Georgia assumed it had to restore its territorial 
integrity (German 2006, 8). Besides Abkhazia also Transnistria and Gagauzia are part of the 
Passportizatsiya (Passportization policy), different scholars have emphasized that this 
passportization is smaller than in Abkhazia (Fisher 2016). The former Bashkan even asked to 
provide passports (Infotag 2014). As Fisher emphasizes (Fisher 2016):  
The naturalisation of other states’ citizens does not per se represent a 
violation of their sovereignty. But if it is conducted on a massive scale and 
those naturalised retain their residence abroad, it can produce a sovereignty 
conflict. 
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The passportization can produce a sovereignty conflict since Russia wants to 'protect’ its 
citizens. Since many of ‘its’ passportized citizens live in that area it can react to protect these 
citizens when necessary, for example during a civil war. Therefor Russia is not only a third 
actor in all three regions, it is also a dangerous third party with a lot of influence that could 
escalate the frozen conflict.  
 4.8 Did this region organize events to sabotage EU rapprochement? 
 Both Abkhazia and Transnistria did not organize any events to prevent EU 
rapprochement of both Georgia and Moldova. At the time of their dissidence, the nineties, 
there where no signs of EU rapprochement for both Georgia and Moldova, and so both 
dissident regions could not have been involved in sabotaging EU rapprochement. Also in the 
years up to now both regions did not bother EU rapprochement of their sovereign state, 
mainly due to the fact that this issue is not part of the debate between the two parties.     
 Gagauzia, on the other hand, organized a referendum where the Gagauz were asked to 
indicate whether they supported the policy of joining the EU or the EAEU. The results were 
obvious. Gagauzia intended to block Moldova's rapprochement towards the EU. As 
explained, this referendum did not change the situation but gained increased attention from 
both the EU and Moldova. Besides a referendum, the people of Gagauzia regularly hold 
demonstrations to show their dissatisfaction with policies of both Moldova and the EU (TASS 
2014).  
Table 9. May Gagauzia be the new Luhansk, Abkhazia, or South Ossetia? 
Due to the fact that a referendum was organized and demonstrations regularly 
occurred some scholars claimed that Gagauzia could be the next conflict zone on European 
soil. All interviewees indicate that these statements were overblown. However, they also 
emphasized the region should be watched closely because it remains tense. This extra 
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attention is caused by Gagauzia’s large Russian focus. Taking history and the current 
dissident regions Crimea, Luhansk, and Donbass into consideration, Gagauzia gained 
increased attention from both the EU and Moldova after the referendum in 2014. Both actors 
knew what could happen in regions with a large Russian focus.  
4.9 Did the relations between the sovereign state and the dissident region changed 
over the past five years? 
 Over the past year relations between Moldova and Transnistria did not change 
essentially; the status quo remains and negotiations are ongoing but without visible results. 
The only remarkable change is the resumption of the 5+2 peace talks, these talks continue 
slowly but do not show decisive solutions . The relations between Moldova and Transnistria 7
can be classified as stuck and non-violent. The relations between Abkhazia and Georgia did 
change: the dialogue between both became less tense, and there are actual negotiations on-
going (Russian Delegation at the OSCE 2016), besides this it is now possible to cross the 
border between Abkhazia and Georgia.  
 Relations between Gagauzia and Moldova also changed: they became worse. For 
years now, the Gagauz representatives feel they only receive what is left from the state budget 
and not the amount they deserve (Interviewee 5 2017). Furthermore, there is a strong 
awareness that their autonomy is not implemented (Anghelov 2017). Thirdly, Gagauz do not 
feel respected in their relations with Russia. With the new Baskhan, Irina Vlah, the 
relationship changed but is still tense and under pressure. 
Table 10. Is there a possible solution between Moldova and Gagauzia? 
 The 5 + 2 Peace talks involve Russia, US, Ukraine, Moldova, OSCE, EU and Transnistria. The talks concern 7
the subjects: conflict settlement, dialogue and confidence building between Transnistria and Moldova. 
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As mentioned, one of the problems is the not respected autonomy of Gagauzia. According to 
most interviewees, respecting the autonomy would be a significant step in improving the 
relationship between Gagauzia and Moldova (Table 10).  
This implementation of the autonomy can only be achieved when integration between the 
Moldovan and Gagauz communities takes place. This integration should be enforced by more 
contact between politicians and Gagauz inhabitants. Currently, this does not happen, 
Pistrinciuc indicates why (Pistrinciuc 2017): 
The Moldovan government and Gagauzia need to go ahead with the ‘94 law. It 
should be harmonized with other laws. The government started this process, but 
it goes very slow. The option is to do this step by step without political 
discourse. We fear they might further separate from Moldova when the ‘94 law 
is implemented.  
Since the Moldovan government still fears Gagauz secession, it has not implemented the 
Gagauz autonomy. In addition to communication and integration, Moldova and Gagauzia 
need to invest in confidence building. Therefor the relation between Moldova and Gagauzia 
remains tense and sensitive for further escalation because there is no progress visible in the 
policies of the Moldovan government which show any change in the policies towards 
Gagauzia.  
4.10 Is the region mentioned as an obstacle in the AA? 
 All three dissident regions are not mentioned as obstacles in the AA. Both Transnistria 
and Abkhazia are mentioned as regions belonging to the territory of their sovereign states and 
the fact that the policies of the AA are not applicable within the regions. Gagauzia is not 
mentioned at all, possibly because at the time of provisionally applying, 2014, the situation in 
Gagauzia just started to become tense. Next to this, Gagauzia is part of the Moldovan 
Republic and so it is not necessary to mention the region separately, other Moldovan regions 
are not mentioned as well.  
4.11 Does the EU see these dissident regions as a problem for accession? 
 There are a few leitmotifs that indicate that the EU does not consider dissident regions 
in its rapprochement policies. In 2004, the EU enlarged with ten new member states, 
including Cyprus. Cyprus has also a dissident region on its territory: The Turkish Republic of 
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Northern Cyprus. Up to today no solution has been found to solve this dispute. The EU has 
tried to solve this conflict by offering membership to Cyprus and, at the same time, adding the 
point of restoring the original Cypriot Republic to the list of demands for Turkish-EU 
membership (Tocci 2002), still not implemented. Although a dissident region was on its 
territory, EU accession for Cyprus happened, though without the northern part of the island.  
Another example is Serbia. Unlike Cyprus, Serbia is still not a member state of the 
EU. Serbia currently is candidate member for the EU. One of the final struggles is the issue 
with the dissident region Kosovo. The EU demands the following concerning Serbian 
accession (European Commission 2012, 26): 
A visible and sustainable improvement in relations between Serbia and Kosovo 
is needed so that both can continue on their respective paths towards the EU, 
while avoiding that either can block the other in these efforts. This process 
should gradually result in the full normalisation of relations between Serbia and 
Kosovo with the prospect of both able to fully exercise their rights and fulfil 
their responsibilities within the EU …. will be an essential element of this 
process.  
When reading this statement, a direct conflict solution is not a necessity for Serbian 
accession. The EU requires normalisation of relations between Serbia and Kosovo, a wide 
interpretable demand. This demand indicates that if a sovereign state contains a dissident 
region on its territory, it is still possible to become member state of the EU. EU membership 
does not require new member states to solve their territorial problems before accession.  
 This short analysis showed the EU accepted Cyprus as a member state while it had a 
dissident region on its territory. Moreover, the EU continues to negotiate with Serbia, which 
also has a dissident region on its territory. Also Moldova and Georgia are saddled with 
dissident regions, nevertheless it is a fact that rapprochement continues and increases. 
Because Abkhazia, Gagauzia, and Transnistria are in some way similar in their dissidence, to 
both Northern Cyprus and Kosovo, the EU should not see the three dissident regions as a 
problem in the accession process of Moldova or Georgia. It shows dissident regions do not 
have a strong ability to prevent accession of their sovereign state.  
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 Notably, regions such as Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Nagorno Karabakh, and 
Transnistria have just few direct diplomatic lines with independent states . Like most states, 8
the EU member states do not recognize these regions. Still, one of these dissident regions 
does have diplomatic relations: Gagauzia. Gagauzia has strong economic and cultural ties 
with Turkey and Russia. Strong ties between de EU and Gagauzia are absent. Before 2014, 
diplomatic relations between the EU and Gagauzia were negligible but the referendum, the 
EU started to pay more attention to Gagauzia. Although the European Union does not 
recognize most of the dissident regions, it does have few policies regarding these regions to 
contain their influence or prevent escalation. 
  
Table 11. Do you think Gagauzia has any influence on the rapprochement of Moldova to the EU? 
Most interviewees indicated that Gagauzia does not influence the rapprochement of 
Moldova towards the EU, the interviewees have different reasons for this. Interviewee 7 
emphasized Gagauzia is not important for Moldova in its decision making, and therefore, it 
will continue to ensure Gagauzia will not have this ability. Anghelov is consistent herewith 
but mentions Gagauzia continues to try to influence the process of the non-implemented 
autonomy, though without visible success. Sirkeli adds that Gagauzia does not really try to 
influence Moldova’s EU rapprochement since it now receives more financial resources and 
attention.  
 Many of the interviewees agreed that Gagauzia cannot influence Moldova's EU 
rapprochement, though Gagauzia can influence specific aspects of the EU, such as the 
division of EU-Moldova resources. After the 2014 referendum, the annual funds to Gagauzia 
increased; so one can conclude that Gagauzia may have changed the nature of some EU 
 Transnistria is recognized by Abkhazia, the Republic of Artsakh and South Ossetia; Abkhazia is recognized by 8
the Republic of Artsakh, Russia, Transnistria, South Ossetia, Nicaragua, Venezuela and Nauru; South Ossetia is 
recognized by Russia, Transtira, Abkhazia, Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and the Republic of Artsakh; The 
Republic of Artsakh is recognized by Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria.
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funds. Gagauzia also raised the level of EU attention towards the region. The EU is now 
much more involved in its affairs than it was previously. 
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5. Conclusion 
 The research question of this thesis is: Do the dissident regions Abkhazia, Gagauzia, 
and Transnistria influence the rapprochement of their sovereign state towards the European 
Union? Table 5 indicated that all three dissident regions do not influence the EU 
rapprochement of their sovereign state. As shown in all three cases, the relationship or 
connection between the EU and dissident regions: 
1.  Is lacking; 
2.  Does not exist at all; or 
3.  The organization plays no significant role in their existence;.  
The EU is, in their eyes, connected to their sovereign state, from which they are alienated and 
so they see it as an “opponent”. On the other hand, the EU itself does not have great interest 
in the dissident regions since there is a non-recognition policy but also because the main 
negotiations are with the sovereign state and all non-agreeing parties are not part of this. The 
EU does not take them into account when creating policies regarding their sovereign state. 
One of the first reasons to conclude that dissident regions have no influence are the 
accession of Cyprus and the accession negotiations of Serbia. As discussed, Cyprus joined the 
EU in 2004 while it had a dissident region, Northern Cyprus, on its territory. During the 
negotiations, Northern Cyprus was a part of the accession negotiations in a way that the EU 
tried to solve the conflict. This without significant result with as a consequence Cyprus joined 
the EU but without its northern part. The EU did not take the frozen conflict into 
consideration when it granted Cyprus membership of the EU, it was not a vital aspect of the 
negotiations. So it can be concluded that the EU will never let its accession policies get 
influenced by actors such as dissident regions. Another indicator of overlooking dissident 
regions are the accession negotiations between the EU and Serbia, which are currently 
ongoing. Although Serbia has a dissident actor on its territory the EU still continues its 
accession-negotiations with Serbia and does not consider Kosovo in it.  
The last indicator are the sovereign states Moldova and Georgia. Here, the EU 
continues rapprochement policies while dissident regions are present. During this 
rapprochement the EU did not take the three regions into consideration, the sovereign state 
and the EU increased their rapprochement even more. The EU is not sensitive for the 
practices of different dissident regions, it does not take these actions into account when 
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making decisions about accession, membership or rapprochement. The most common practice 
concerning these regions is just ignoring them or trying to spawn them by assigning financial 
resources.    
Like the EU, the sovereign states have similar, poor developed, relationships with 
dissident regions. As the EU, states will not consider dissident regions in their decision 
making about EU rapprochement. Subsequently, the interviewees also indicated Gagauzia 
does not have any influence on the rapprochement process. ‘There is some influence, but it is 
not decisive’, according to Pistrinciuc. In connection therewith, the reasons not to consider 
the argumentation of these dissident regions has not only to do with unwillingness. A 
sovereign state is responsible for all citizens within this state and often when the general 
public opinion is in favor of EU rapprochement, the state will act according to the will of the 
majority of the population. As interviewee 6 indicates (Interviewee 6 2017):  
The Gagauz population is just 1.5%  of  the  total  Moldovan  population,  it  is 
common sense that the Moldovan government does not let  this 1.5% decide 
over the other large part of the population.  
As the quote indicates, it is common sense not to let this small community decide for the 
whole Moldovan community. Therefor states will not take dissident regions, especially when 
they are small, into consideration when it concerns EU rapprochement but also other policies.  
As mentioned, dissident regions do not influence the EU, the sovereign state and the 
relation between them. But several interviewees indicated that dissident regions can influence 
certain minor EU policies or policy implementation aspects. An example of this is the 
situation in 2014: Gagauzia organized a referendum which caused tensions within Moldova, 
also the EU noticed these tensions and acted upon them. These actions often have underlying 
aspects which come up when one looks deeper into the uncertainties of a region. Soon after 
the referendum was organized it became clear that the initial aim was not to put an end to EU 
rapprochement of Moldova but that it wanted more attention for its own internal situation. 
This internal situation is worrisome since the Gagauz: 
1.  Are less fortunate in Moldova’s prosperity 
2.  Have to deal with a high level of corruption 
3.  Receive to little of the central Moldovan state-budget to effectively tackle its 
internal problems. 
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4. Still have to deal with the non-implemented autonomy.  
Therefor the Gagauz tried to draw attention by organizing this referendum. This ‘cry for 
attention’ was notified by the EU and acted upon it in two ways namely:
1.  Demanding Moldova to respect the autonomy of Gagauzia as was determined in the 
’94 law.  
2.Distribution of EU funds directly to Gagauzia instead of providing the central 
government the responsibility for the distribution of funds.  
Especially second point is important for Gagauzia since EU financial resources were 
distributed by the central government and this government preferred other expenses above 
stimulating Gagauzia. As Vitalli Vlah mentions, after the referendum in 2014, Gagauzia 
received 6.5 million euros, and another five million euros will follow soon. Since these funds 
became available and the EU became more visible, Gagauzia’s dissidence turned lower. To 
conclude, Gagauzia minimally changed the EU policies with regard to Moldova’s financial 
resources. 
 Finally, in all three cases, Russia plays an active role. All three regions have active 
relations with Russia; they see Russia as their patron state, which can protect each of the 
regions. Furthermore, the spoken language in all three regions is Russian, and most 
importantly, all media and information sources are Russified. As mentioned by the different 
interviewees, people do not have an independent view of the news and what happening, they 
have a Russian perspectives due to complete Russian media coverage. These three aspects 
make the dissident character of the region stronger in its dissidence towards the sovereign 
nation. Moreover, Russia itself has no problems with supporting the regions in their 
dissidence because they create disorder and instability in the states surrounding Russia.    
 I started this research mostly because I was interested in Gagauzia stimulated by some 
of the following headlines: “Gagauzia: Growing Separatism in Moldova?”, “Gagauzia: 
strategic point of pressure”, “Gagauzia: A bone in the Throat”, “Is Gagauzia next on Russia’s 
list?”, “Gagauzia: A new Stumbling block for Moldova”, and “Gagauzia: Another Obstacle on 
Moldova’s path to Europe”. When I read these headlines, I was both surprised and distrustful. 
The headlines raised questions as to whether this region has the power to create what most of 
the authors claimed. However, as Interviewee 6 said, “This is overblown, they are afraid of 
military escalation. Gagauzia does not have this kind of influence”. I agree with this 
statement and do not believe Gagauzia influences the EU rapprochement of Moldova. Also in 
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general, dissident regions do not have the power and capacities to influence their sovereign 
states on issues such as European Union rapprochement. The sovereign nation will mostly 
care about the majority of the people, its own interests and will not give in to the dissident 
region’s demands. The reasons for this is to prevent the region will be an example for other 
regions. On the other hand, Gagauzia has proven that causing trouble can attract attention, 
which ensures acceding some of the demands. These extra treatments are often small enough 
to satisfy the needs of the dissident region. Besides capacities, both the EU and the sovereign 
state will not consider the dissident regions in their decision making, they will mostly ignore 
them.  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